

# Clearstream Group

## Remuneration Report for 2023

This report discloses information on remuneration for Clearstream Group (including Clearstream Holding AG, Clearstream Banking AG and Clearstream Banking S.A.)

according to

Article 450 of the Regulation (EU) 2019/876 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (CRR II),

§ 16 of the German Remuneration Ordinance for Institutions (InstitutsVergV) of 16 December 2013 (BGBl. I p. 4270) last amended by Article 1 of the Ordinance of 14 February 2023 (BGBl. 2023 I – No. 41), and

Circular 22/797 of the Luxembourgish Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier (CSSF).

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## 1. Preamble

Clearstream Holding AG has to fulfil regulatory requirements regarding remuneration on consolidated group level ("Clearstream Group") as superordinate company of regulated credit institutions in Germany (Clearstream Banking AG) and Luxembourg (Clearstream Banking S.A.).

The regulatory requirements on remuneration are manifested in particular in Regulation (EU) No. 2019/876 ("CRR II"), Directive (EU) 2019/878 ("CRD V") and the EBA Guidelines 2021/04 on sound remuneration policies (in the following referred as "EBA-Guidelines").

According to the legislative processes, the therefrom deriving requirements were implemented on national levels. In contrast to regulations such as CRR II that are binding directly for the member states to whom they are addressed, guidelines or directives such as CRD V have to be implemented on national level.

In Germany, the implementation took place mainly through amendments of the German Remuneration Ordinance for Institutions (Institutsvergütungsverordnung, in the following referred to as "InstitutsVergV")<sup>1</sup> and the German Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz, in the following referred to as "KWG").

In Luxembourg, CRD was reflected by the amendment from 23 July 2015 of the Law of 5 April 1993 on the financial sector (in the following referred to as "LFS")<sup>2</sup>, and corresponding CSSF circulars. CRD related remuneration rules apply since 2014 to all Luxembourg entities of the Clearstream Group. In addition, Clearstream Banking S.A. is subject to the requirements of the Circular 22/797 issued by the Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier (in the following referred to as "CSSF") on single entity level.

The Remuneration Report for 2023 at hand provides qualitative and quantitative information on remuneration of Clearstream Group for the financial year 2023 pursuant to the requirements that apply to Clearstream Holding AG, Clearstream Banking AG and Clearstream Banking S.A. on remuneration disclosure according to Article 450 CRR II, § 16 InstitutsVergV and/or section 17 EBA-Guidelines (the term "Company" does refer in the following to either Clearstream Holding AG, Clearstream Banking AG and Clearstream Banking S.A. unless stated otherwise).

Due to the interconnectedness between the different Clearstream companies, the information disclosed in this report covers the remuneration of all categories of employees whose professional activities have a material impact on the risk profile of Clearstream Group or of the respective institution (in the following referred to as "Risk Takers"<sup>3</sup>), which are identified from a Clearstream Holding AG, Clearstream Banking AG and/or Clearstream Banking S.A. perspective, regardless of the company the Risk Takers are under contract

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<sup>1</sup> The requirements on national level were implemented through the InstitutsVergV dated 16 December 2013. "InstitutsVergV" in this report refers to the revised version from 14 February 2023.

<sup>2</sup> Law of 23 July 2015 amending the Law of 5 April 1993 on the financial sector.

<sup>3</sup> The term "Risk Taker" refers to the Members of the Executive Board as well as to executive or non-executive employees identified as Risk Takers, unless stated otherwise.

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with. Consequently, remuneration data for identified Risk Takers under contract with Clearstream London Ltd, Clearstream Services S.A. or Clearstream International S.A., are included in this Remuneration Report for 2023. The qualitative and appropriate quantitative criteria on the identification of Risk Takers are set out in the Regulation (EU) No 2021/923 (Regulatory Technical Standard, in the following referred to as “EBA-RTS”).

Clearstream Holding AG is classified as major institution according to KWG and is subject to InstitutsVergV. As superordinate company of Clearstream Group it sets out the group-wide remuneration strategy according to § 27 InstitutsVergV in line with the specific requirements on remuneration. As credit institution, Clearstream Banking AG is subject to the requirements on remuneration in accordance with the InstitutsVergV and KWG. Clearstream Banking AG does fulfil the general and special requirements of KWG and InstitutsVergV since their implementation in 2014. Clearstream Banking S.A. in Luxembourg is subject to the requirements set by Circular 22/797 applying the EBA-Guidelines. As (international) central securities depositories, both Clearstream Banking AG and Clearstream Banking S.A., fulfil requirements on remuneration stipulated in Regulation (EU) No. 909/2014 and Regulation (EU) No. 2017/392 (in the following referred to as “CSDR”).

In 2023, no external consultant was mandated in the context of the design and implementation of the remuneration systems.

References made to persons in the masculine for reasons of readability apply equally in the feminine and diverse.

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## **2. Compensation governance**

### **2.1. Responsibilities for the remuneration systems**

Within Clearstream Holding AG, Clearstream Banking AG and Clearstream Banking S.A. a two-tier board structure is in place. This structure features a clear separation between the powers of the Supervisory Board, which monitors and advises the Executive Board, and the Executive Board itself, which carries out the day-to-day business.

The respective Supervisory Board of Clearstream Holding AG, Clearstream Banking AG and Clearstream Banking S.A. acts as responsible body to implement the remuneration policy for the Executive Board. The remuneration policy for employees below the Executive Board lies in the responsibility of the Executive Board.

In 2023 the Supervisory Boards of Clearstream Holding AG, Clearstream Banking S.A and Clearstream Banking AG held each four meetings which dealt with remuneration related topics. Both, Clearstream Banking AG and Clearstream Banking S.A., set up a Remuneration Committee on legal entity level to support the Supervisory Board in remuneration-related matters (see chapter 2.4).

The Executive Board of Clearstream Holding AG as superordinate company according to the KWG is responsible for the implementation of a Clearstream group-wide remuneration policy and approved the corresponding resolutions on remuneration topics. The Clearstream Group remuneration system is implemented in a cascading process from group level down to entity level. The Compensation Officer supports the Supervisory Board of Clearstream Holding AG and Clearstream Banking AG in assessing the appropriateness of the remuneration systems for Clearstream Group and Clearstream Banking AG.

The Remuneration Advisory Board (in the following referred to as “RAB”, for further details see chapter 2.3) of Clearstream Holding AG ensures an appropriate involvement of the control functions and other relevant functions in the design and monitoring of the remuneration systems for Clearstream Group.

### **2.2. Compensation Officer**

Within the remuneration governance under the respective regulatory requirements, the Compensation Officer of Clearstream Holding AG and Clearstream Banking AG ensures appropriate, long-term and effective control of the Company’s remuneration systems according to §§ 23 – 26 InstitutsVergV. The Compensation Officer has a direct functional and disciplinary reporting line to the Executive Board of Clearstream Holding AG and Clearstream Banking AG and has a direct functional reporting line to the respective Supervisory Boards.

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Main activities performed in 2023:

- involvement in the continuous analysis of regulatory requirements and alignment regarding the necessary changes,
- involvement in the remuneration policy review, including the review of the respective plan documents,
- involvement in the process to identify Risk Takers within Clearstream Group,
- involvement in the preparation and conduction of the merit process,
- ongoing monitoring of the remuneration systems of employees below the Executive Board,
- ongoing monitoring of the hedging prohibition,
- preparation of the combined Report according to § 12 InstitutsVergV and § 24 InstitutsVergV, and,
- supporting the Supervisory Boards within Clearstream Group as well as the respective Remuneration Committee of Clearstream Banking AG and Clearstream Banking S.A. (from a Clearstream Group perspective) in fulfilling their responsibilities in designing and monitoring the Executive Board remuneration (preparation of meetings of the respective Supervisory Board and Remuneration Committee).

### **2.3. Remuneration Advisory Board**

The Remuneration Advisory Board ("RAB") is set up on the level of Clearstream Holding AG by the Executive Board for the purpose to involve the control and corporate units in the design and development of the remuneration systems in accordance with regulatory requirements.

According to the rules of procedure, the RAB was involved in the design and development of the Clearstream Group's remuneration systems covering the remuneration of all employees (the term "employees" refers to non-executive, executive employees as well as the Members of the Executive Board, irrespective if identified as Risk Taker or not, unless stated otherwise). The RAB supports Clearstream Group's efforts to ensure compliance of its remuneration system with regulatory requirements and applicable law.

The members of the RAB include representatives of control units such as Internal Audit, Compliance, Risk Management and the Compensation Officer as well as representatives of Human Relations, Finance and Legal in order to adequately involve these units in the design, development and oversight of the remuneration systems.

Regarding its tasks and in the context of its meeting in 2023, the RAB consulted about:

- the design and implementation of the remuneration system for 2023,
  - the regulatory framework for remuneration systems for 2023.
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## **2.4. Remuneration Committee**

Clearstream Banking AG and Clearstream Banking S.A. have established based on Article 48 CSDR and respectively for Clearstream Banking AG based on Article § 25d (12) KWG and § 15 InstitutsVergV, each a Remuneration Committee.

The core task of the respective Remuneration Committee is to supervise the reasonableness of the remuneration system for the Members of the Executive Board of Clearstream Banking AG respectively Clearstream Banking S.A.. Further, it reviews the appropriateness of the remuneration of the head of the risk control function and of the compliance function as well as of such employees having a substantial influence on the overall risk profile of the Company and supports the Supervisory Board in the monitoring of the reasonableness of the remuneration system of the Company and assesses the effects of the remuneration system to the risk, capital and liquidity management.

In 2023, the Remuneration Committee of Clearstream Banking AG and Clearstream Banking S.A. decided e.g. upon the total amount of variable remuneration for 2022, the individual variable remuneration 2022 for the Members of the Executive Board and the remuneration packages as well as the individual targets for 2023 for the Members of the Executive Board and reviewed the remuneration packages of the senior management in control functions. Further, the respective Remuneration Committee reviewed the design and monitored the adequacy of the remuneration system and assessed it as appropriate.

They acknowledged the Risk Taker analysis for the year 2023. Moreover, the respective Remuneration Committee assessed the measurement and Deferral Periods for Risk Takers. In doing so, the Remuneration Committees ensured that the remuneration systems are aligned with the business and risk strategy and monitored the appropriateness of the remuneration systems for the Executive Board and employee groups below.

The Remuneration Committee of Clearstream Banking AG met four times and the Remuneration Committee of Clearstream Banking S.A. met two times in 2023.

The Remuneration Committee of Clearstream Banking AG consists of Stephan Leithner (Chairman) as well as Christina Bannier and Norfried Stumpf. The Remuneration Committee of Clearstream Banking S.A. consists of Stephan Leithner (Chairman), Gregor Pottmeyer and Wolfgang Gaertner.

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### 3. Remuneration systems

#### 3.1. Remuneration principles

The remuneration system for Executives and Risk Takers fosters a high-performance orientation as well as an enhanced share-based orientation to comply with regulatory requirements and to ensure a sustainable development.

The remuneration principles are set out in the Clearstream Group remuneration policy, which is reviewed regularly and implemented by the respective Boards. Further remuneration principles are included in the individuals' service respectively employment contracts, the variable remuneration schemes for Risk Takers, the applicable terms and conditions for the long-term sustainable instrument (in the following referred to as "LSI") or the restricted stock units (in the following referred to as "RSU")<sup>4</sup>.

The remuneration policy is an important framework to ensure alignment with the business and risk strategy, including environmental, social and governance (ESG) targets, and is a central element for the implementation of the remuneration systems within the organization. It aims at:

- setting out the principles governing the remuneration systems of Clearstream Group, including Clearstream Holding AG, Clearstream Banking AG and Clearstream Banking S.A., in the organisational guidelines,
- ensuring that the remuneration in the Clearstream Group companies is in line with the applicable regulations on remuneration,
- informing employees on the applicable rules as well as on their remuneration system,
- describing the determination of the total amount of variable remuneration, and
- aligning the interests of the shareholders and employees, particularly for Risk Takers by using LSI and RSU, if applicable.

Clearstream Holding AG, as superordinate company, Clearstream Banking AG as well as Clearstream Banking S.A. performed several activities to ensure that the remuneration policy and the remuneration principles are in line with applicable regulations on remuneration, e.g. they conducted the regular review of the remuneration policy in the course of 2023 to ensure reflection of the requirements of InstitutsVergV in its latest version, as well as reviewed up-to-datedness with other applicable regulations such as CSDR.

Furthermore, and as a general rule, Clearstream Group does not guarantee variable remuneration. In accordance with regulatory requirements, it may only be awarded in exceptional cases, is limited to new hires from outside the Company for a maximum period

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<sup>4</sup> LSI and RSU are both instruments with share-based character. After final conversion, a payout in cash applies. No real shares will be granted.

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of one year and subject to appropriate equity and liquidity resources as well as sufficient capital to ensure its risk-bearing capacity.

### **3.2. Overview of the remuneration systems**

The remuneration for Risk Takers including members of the Executive Board of Clearstream Holding AG, Clearstream Banking AG, Clearstream Banking S.A. as well as for executive and non-executive employees consists of a fixed salary and variable remuneration, which is in general and amongst others specified in the respective service or employment contracts.

For Germany, the fixed remuneration of non-executive employees under the collective agreement considers the utilized salary table. In Luxembourg, the fixed remuneration of non-executive employees takes into consideration the Collective Bargaining Agreement for the Banking Sector in which Clearstream Banking S.A. takes part. Non-executive employees may be granted variable remuneration in form of a cash bonus and they are evaluated through the performance & goals system.

The remuneration systems for the Risk Takers and non Risk Taker Executives follow the guiding principles of the remuneration system of Deutsche Börse AG Executive Board to ensure group-wide alignment. Variable remuneration is measured in an additive bonus system generally considering the three measurement levels Deutsche Börse Group, Company and individual. Targets include the Key Performance Indicators Net Revenues / EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, amortization and impairment losses) as well as ESG Targets (Environmental, Social, Governance) and individual goals (including the area of responsibility), which are derived from the Clearstream strategy.

Executive employees who are not identified as Risk Takers can receive, under consideration of the target achievement, a "Performance Bonus" in cash and share-based variable remuneration in form of a "Stock Bonus Plan". The determination of the variable remuneration is based on the performance of Deutsche Börse Group, the Company performance (derived from the segment) as well as the overall performance rating on individual and area/team level.

Risk Takers can receive a variable remuneration according to the conditions of the respective variable remuneration scheme for Risk Takers and depending on the Risk Taker category as well as the terms and conditions of the LSI respectively the terms and conditions of the LSI and RSU. The individual variable remuneration takes into consideration the "Target Variable Remuneration," the performance of Deutsche Börse Group, the respective Company performance (derived from the segment) as well as the overall performance rating on individual level including area /team level.

For all executive employees, a so-called "Indicative Bonus Amount" which is subject to the final decision of the respective decision-making bodies, is calculated: the target achievement on Deutsche Börse Group, Company level (derived from the segment) and

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the overall performance rating on individual level result in the Overall Target Achievement. The Overall Target Achievement is multiplied with the individual Target Variable Remuneration which leads to the Indicative Bonus Amount.

Net Revenues / EBITDA and ESG Targets on Deutsche Börse Group Level are key elements for variable remuneration and for executing and supporting the Deutsche Börse Group strategy and account to one third to the Overall Target Achievement. In addition, the Net Revenues and the EBITDA of the Company, derived from the Clearstream Segment, contribute to another third. Individual goals which cover the level of the area of responsibility as well as the individual level contribute to the determination to one third, too. They shall consider quantitative and qualitative goals. For executive employees in control units a control unit specific weighting of goals applies.

The following specifications are only applicable for employees identified as Risk Takers and complement the aforementioned systemic fundamentals that apply to all executive employees. For Risk Takers in control units, the Members of the Executive Board or the Member of the Executive Board responsible for risk controlling, systemic differences apply.

The target achievement on Company measurement level and the individual goals are multiplied with a risk adjustment factor. This risk adjustment, reflecting the limits according to the respective risk strategy by Risk Management, is in general based on the ratio of Value at Risk ("VaR") relative to the Available Risk Bearing Capacity ("ARBC") per risk type and considers a liquidity indicator.

The final bonus amount is subject to decision of the respective decision-making bodies (an adjustment of +/- 20% of Target Variable Remuneration may apply for Risk Takers). The allocation maximum is 200% of the Target Variable Remuneration. The shareholders passed a resolution on the maximum variable remuneration of 200% of the annual fixed remuneration according to regulatory requirements (so-called Bonus Cap) regarding the provisions of § 25a (5) sentence 5 KWG. For Clearstream Banking S.A., respective decisions are sought for relevant individuals according to the Article 38-6 LFS.

If the Supervisory Board, the Executive Board and/or the line manager of a Risk Taker decides in an overall assessment that the awarding of variable remuneration is not appropriate, there is no right to the award. Thereby, the Supervisory Board, the Executive Board and/or the line manager consider all circumstances leading to significant underperformance or negative performance contributions causing significant financial losses or damage to the reputation for the Company. This also applies in the event of individual unconscionable conduct or conduct in breach of duty as defined in the remuneration policy and the respective variable remuneration schemes.


Overall, the determination of Variable Remuneration considers especially current and future risks, corporate values and risk appetite as well as long-term interests in accordance with the Company's risk strategy, which is derived from the business strategy on different levels:

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Current risks are reflected on Company measurement level (derived from segment) and on individual measurement level by applying a Risk Adjustment Factor, which is based on the Company's RBC (Risk Bearing Capacity) utilisation per risk type and the liquidity indicator reflecting the Company's risk appetite and tolerance to the financial impact of risk and on individual measurement level by setting risk adjusted goals, which shall align the employee's professional activities to the respective risk strategy (e.g. risk reporting, risk committee preparation, fire-drills).

Future risks are reflected on Company measurement level in the review of sustainability, which aims also to align the Total Amount to prospective Company's development and on individual measurement level by applying malus and clawback arrangements (where applicable and regulatory required).

The payout of any variable remuneration is subject to a check for side conditions in institutions according to § 7 InstitutsVergV respectively Section 14 EBA-Guidelines (i.e. Company/Group performance, capital planning, liquidity requirements, risk bearing capacity) and backtesting (for further details see chapter 3.6).



Graphic 1: Exemplary process of awarding variable remuneration to Risk Takers. The Indicative Bonus Amount is subject to decision of the respective decision-making bodies.

Depending on the category of Risk Taker, 40% to 73% of the variable remuneration are deferred (the RSU generally for five, the LSI over a period of generally four to five years<sup>5</sup>, both paid out after an additional retention period of one year). The share-based components RSU and LSI link parts of the variable remuneration with a sustainable development. The Deferral Period is defined in accordance with the regulatory

5 For new Executive Board members a phase-in has been introduced, i.e. a Deferral period of 7 years applies to the variable remuneration from the first year as Executive Board member, and a Deferral period of 6 years applies to the variable remuneration from the second year as Executive Board member.


requirements, the Company's/Clearstream Group's business cycle as well as the nature and risk content of Clearstream's business activities.

Overall, the variable remuneration systems do not incentivise to take disproportional high risks and is designed in a way that variable remuneration can be reduced to zero to comply with the regulatory requirements of § 45 KWG and of Articles 38.5 and 38.6 of the LFS.

### 3.2.1. Risk Takers in Control Units

The individual goals for Risk Takers in control units shall be independent from the performance of the business area they monitor and should not compromise their independence or create potential conflicts of interest in their advisory role. To ensure that the remuneration parameters of Risk Takers in control units and the business units they control are not predominantly synchronized, targets only include Net Revenues / EBITDA as well as ESG Targets on Deutsche Börse Group level and individual goals. The Overall Target Achievement is measured by the targets on Group measurement level and by the individual goals, which are equally weighted. Within the measurement level of Deutsche Börse Group, equally weighted Net Revenues / EBITDA combined have a weighting of five out of six and the ESG Targets combined have a weighting of one out of six.

Specifically for Risk Takers in control units primarily control targets shall be set. The target achievement on Group measurement level and overall performance rating on individual level, multiplied with the respective risk adjustment factor, result in the Overall Target Achievement.



Graphic 2: Exemplary process of awarding variable remuneration to Risk Takers in control units. The Indicative Bonus Amount is subject to decision of the respective decision-making bodies.

### **3.2.2. Risk Takers as Members of the Executive Board and as Members of the Executive Board responsible for Risk Controlling**

The members of the Executive Board of Clearstream Holding AG, Clearstream Banking AG and Clearstream Banking S.A. are identified as Risk Takers. The award of variable remuneration follows the system set out in section 3.2., however goal setting and the assessment of goal achievement is performed by the Supervisory Board considering the recommendation of the Remuneration Committee (if applicable). For the Members of the Executive Board an assessment of the performance in a multi-year measurement, based on annual targets, applies.

A phase-in approach for new Members of the Executive Board is implemented to ensure that the reduced measurement period is balanced by an extended Deferral Period.

Regulations set special requirements on the remuneration system for the Members of the Executive Board responsible for Risk Controlling: In order to ensure that the remuneration parameters of the Member of the Executive Board responsible for Risk Controlling are not predominantly synchronized with those for the business units overseen, targets include Net Revenues / EBITDA as well as ESG Targets of Deutsche Börse Group and Net Revenues / EBITDA of the respective Company, each measurement level with a weighting of one quarter, as well as individual goals (including the area of responsibility) with a weighting of one half. Within the measurement level of Deutsche Börse Group, equally weighted Net Revenues / EBITDA combined have a weighting of two thirds and the ESG Targets combined have a weighting of one third. Within the measurement level of the respective Company, Net Revenues / EBITDA are equally weighted.

The individual goals for the Member of the Executive Board responsible for Risk Controlling shall be independent from the performance of the business area they monitor and should neither compromise their independence nor create conflicts of interest in their control function role. Therefore, primarily control goals shall be set.

### **3.3. Total Amount of variable remuneration**

The award of variable remuneration requires the respective Supervisory Board to jointly with the respective Executive Board resolve upon a sufficient Total Amount of variable remuneration (the "Total Amount") for the performance period, out of which among others the Risk Takers of the respective Company will be awarded.

For the financial year 2023, the Total Amount was resolved upon as well as was defined in a formalised and transparent process under involvement of the control units and complying with § 7 InstitutsVergV respectively Section 14 EBA-Guidelines.

Precondition to this resolution upon a Total Amount is that the respective Company did not experience negative overall business performance. In particular, where this is accompanied by a significant decrease of the Company's enterprise value, generally, no Total Amount will be resolved upon.

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| Assessment of the requirements to determine the Total Amount   |  |               |
|--|--|---------------|
|  |  | Assessment    |
| <b>Overall economic situation</b>  |  |               |
| Overall company performance  | Taking into account economic capital, economic profit, costs of liquidity and capital as well as the assumption of risk, the Company achieves a positive overall business performance.   | ✓/✗           |
| Exceptional cases  | The <i>Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht</i> (or equivalent) allows with respect to extraordinary circumstances, to resolve a Total Amount, regardless of the overall negative business performance.                             | If applicable |
| <b>Requirements of the InstitutsVergV (additional national regulatory requirements may apply by analogy)</b> |  |               |
| section 7 (1)  | The Total Amount was determined under adequate involvement of the control functions corresponding with their scope of tasks.   | ✓/✗           |
| section 7 (1) 1  | When determining the Total Amount, risk-bearing capacity, multi-year capital planning and profitability of the Group and/or Company are taken into account.  | ✓/✗           |
| section 7 (1) 2 a), b)   | The determination of the Total Amount does not limit the Group's and/or the Company's ability to maintain adequate funds and liquidity as well as the combined capital buffer requirements in accordance with section 10i KWG (or equivalent). | ✓/✗           |
| <b>A total amount is resolved upon:</b>  |  | ✓/✗           |

Graphic 3: Overview of the requirements to determine the Total Amount.

The Total Amount is determined by summing up the actual individual variable remuneration that shall be awarded to all employees of the Company whereas such summed up amount is subject to the examination of side conditions (refer to § 7 InstitutsVergV), e.g. on performance criteria derived from the Company's business and risk strategy in order to promote long-term sustainable success of the Company and to adequately reflect costs of capital and liquidity as well as risks incurred.

### 3.4. Risk Taker identification

According to § 25a (5b) KWG and the Regulation (EU) No 2021/923 (EBA-RTS), employees whose professional activities have a material impact on the Company's risk profile must be identified. For the financial year 2023, Clearstream Holding AG, Clearstream Banking AG and Clearstream Banking S.A. performed a risk analysis and identified Risk Takers based on the qualitative and quantitative criteria set out in the EBA-RTS. As superordinate company, Clearstream Holding AG performed the risk analysis on consolidated group level in line with § 27 InstitutsVergV.

Pursuant to regulatory requirements, members of the Supervisory Boards were identified as Risk Takers in 2023. The identified members received only attendance fees, if any, but no remuneration which would be classified as fixed or variable remuneration in the sense of the Remuneration Ordinance for the respective Supervisory Board function.

In general, the Risk Takers of Clearstream Holding AG, Clearstream Banking AG and Clearstream Banking S.A. can be differentiated between Risk Takers as Members of the Executive Board, Members of the Executive Board responsible for Risk Controlling, Risk Takers below the Executive Board (N-1 Risk Takers) and Other Risk Takers differentiated if in a Control Unit or not. Employees within Deutsche Börse Group directly involved in providing services to the Company for the purpose of conducting banking business or supplying financial services within the framework of an outsourcing agreement were

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identified as so-called Group Risk Takers (Group Risk Takers N-1 respectively Group Risk Takers other).

### **3.5. Variable remuneration scheme**

For Risk Takers, the variable remuneration consists of an upfront and a deferred part. Depending on the classification of the respective Risk Taker category, the final bonus amount is split into different instruments, namely the Cash bonus, the LSI shares and the RSU shares (if applicable). Therefore, the respective payout schedules apply.

Clearstream Group applied in accordance with regulatory frameworks in all locations the exemption limit for the payout of the complete variable remuneration. If a Risk Taker is granted variable remuneration of EUR 50,000 or higher or in case the Variable Remuneration is below EUR 50,000 but represents more than one third of the total annual Remuneration, a part of the variable remuneration will be deferred. At least 50% of the deferred and non-deferred parts of the variable remuneration shall be granted in share-based long-term instruments according to regulatory requirements. For eligible persons, with the LSI and the additional RSU (the RSU shares will be deferred for five years with cliff vesting and are subject to an additional retention period of one year), two third of variable remuneration will be awarded in form of share-based instruments.

The LSI links a part of the variable remuneration with a sustainable development. The Deferral Period is defined in accordance with the regulatory requirements, Clearstream Group's business cycle as well as the nature and risk content of Clearstream's business activities. The Deferral Part (non-upfront part) of variable remuneration will be deferred for a period of four or five years and vested pro rata, also depending upon the Risk Taker classification. In every case, an additional retention period of one year applies for the LSI shares.

The RSU shares will be deferred for five years. In addition, and in analogy to the LSI shares, the RSU shares are subject to a retention period of one year. At the end of the retention period, the entire RSU part will be paid out (cliff vesting).

#### **3.5.1. Payout process**

Specific payout schedules with a cash and LSI bonus apply to all Risk Takers. Additionally, the RSU as a long-term share-based component applies to Members of the Executive Board as well as Risk Takers with the internal management level 6<sup>6</sup>. The award is subject to deferral if the exemption limit for Risk Takers does not apply.

For Risk Takers with the RSU (Members of the Executive Board with the internal management level 6, 5\* (reads: "five star" as internal management level) as well as N-1

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<sup>6</sup> The internal management level for Executives incl. Members of the Executive Board ranges to three levels with highest level 6 (below the Executive Board of Deutsche Börse AG). In case of split contracts and different Risk Taker classification, the stricter payout process shall prevail.

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Risk Takers and N-1 Group Risk Takers with internal management level 6, 5\* within Deutsche Börse Group), the award is split into three components:

- One third of the final bonus amount will be converted in cash ("Cash bonus").
- One third of the final bonus amount will be converted into long-term sustainable instruments ("LSI shares") in accordance with the respective terms and conditions of the LSI. The LSI shares will be deferred over a period of five years ("Deferral Period") with pro-rata payout and are subject to an additional retention period of one year.
- One third of the final bonus amount will be converted into Restricted Stock Units ("RSU shares") in accordance with the respective terms and conditions of the RSU. The RSU shares will be deferred for five years and are subject to an additional retention period of one year. Afterwards, the entire RSU part will be granted (cliff vesting).

40% of the Cash bonus and 40% of the LSI shares ("Upfront") are granted upfront. 60% of the Cash bonus and 60% of the LSI shares ("Deferral") will be deferred as described before. Within the Deferral Period, the Deferral will be split into five equal annual instalments. The LSI shares are subject to an additional retention period of one year.

For new Members of the Executive Board the Deferral Period is extended, for further details see section 3.5.2.

For Risk Takers with internal management level 5\*, 5 or non-executive Risk Takers (namely the categories of N-1 Risk Takers, Other Risk Takers, N-1 Group Risk Takers and Other Group Risk Takers) the award is split into two components:

- 50% of the final bonus amount will be converted in cash ("Cash bonus").
- 50% of the final bonus amount will be converted into long-term sustainable instruments ("LSI shares") in accordance with the respective terms and conditions of the LSI. The LSI shares are subject to an additional retention period of one year.

40% (namely the categories of N-1 Risk Takers and N-1 Group Risk Takers) respectively 60% (namely for Other Risk Takers respectively Other Group Risk Takers) will be granted as upfront part. 60% respectively 40% will be deferred over a period of five respectively four years (Deferral Period). Within the Deferral Period, the Deferral will be split into five respectively four equal annual instalments. The LSI shares are subject to an additional retention period of one year. For Risk Taker categories with a less strict payout scheme than for the N-1 Risk Takers, the N-1 Risk Taker scheme is applied in case of an award of Variable Remuneration above the Internal Threshold in accordance with § 20 (3) InstitutsVergV.

Until the final decision regarding the payout of the final bonus amount ("Granting"), there is no right to the Deferral or to the non-deferred parts of the final bonus amount which have already been converted into LSI shares or RSU shares. During the Deferral Period and retention period, there is only a right to an accurate determination of the expected (unpaid) portion of the variable remuneration. Portions of the variable remuneration which are due


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to be paid out but are not effectively paid out or are not converted into LSI shares or RSU shares forfeit and are not carried forward into future years. For the avoidance of doubt, fixed remuneration shall not be subject to deferral or retention periods.

3.5.2. Payout schedules for Risk Takers (different categories)<sup>7</sup>

The graphics below show the payout schedules for each category of Risk Taker.




Graphic 4: Exemplary payout of the variable remuneration (N-1 Risk Takers) with internal management level 5\*, 5 and below

The respective components within the Group Risk Taker category, namely the cash part and the LSI part, may vary with regard to the payout as displayed below.

| Upfront Payments |            | Deferred Payments         |                                 |
|------------------|------------|---------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Cash             | LSI Shares | Cash (annual instalments) | LSI Shares (annual instalments) |
| 20%              | 20%        | 30% (5 x 6%)              | 30% (5 x 6%)                    |

Graphic 5: Overview of N-1 Risk Takers payout schedule (N-1 Risk Takers).


7 For reasons of readability, the percentages in this document are rounded and amount to 100% in each respective case.



Graphic 6: Exemplary payout of the variable remuneration (Other Risk Takers below Internal Threshold).

| Upfront Payments |            | Deferred Payments         |                                 |
|------------------|------------|---------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Cash             | LSI Shares | Cash (annual instalments) | LSI Shares (annual instalments) |
| 30%              | 30%        | 20% (4 x 5%)              | 20% (4 x 5%)                    |

Graphic 7: Overview of Risk Taker payout schedule (Other Risk Takers below Internal Threshold)



Graphic 8: Exemplary payout of the variable remuneration for Risk Takers (Members of the Executive Board, N-1 Risk Takers with internal management level 6 as well as N-1 Group Risk Takers with internal management level 6 within Deutsche Börse Group) with the RSU. For clarification, the 60% deferred and 40% upfront part refer to LSI Shares and Cash Bonus part as base only.

| Upfront Payments |            | Deferred Payments            |                                    |                               |
|------------------|------------|------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Cash             | LSI Shares | Cash<br>(annual instalments) | LSI Shares<br>(annual instalments) | RSU Shares<br>(cliff vesting) |
| 13%              | 13%        | 20%<br>(5 x 4%)              | 20%<br>(5 x 4%)                    | 33%                           |

Graphic 9: Overview of Risk Taker payout schedule for Risk Takers (Members of the Executive Board, N-1 Risk Takers as well as N-1 Group Risk Takers with internal management level 6 within Deutsche Börse Group) with the RSU (rounded figures to enhance readability).

| Upfront Payments |            | Deferred Payments            |                                    |                               |
|------------------|------------|------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Cash             | LSI Shares | Cash<br>(annual instalments) | LSI Shares<br>(annual instalments) | RSU Shares<br>(cliff vesting) |
| 13%              | 13%        | 20%<br>(7 x 2.9%)            | 20%<br>(7 x 2.9%)                  | 33%                           |

Graphic 10: Overview of the payout scheme for new members in the management body of a Company in the first year (rounded figures to enhance readability).

| Upfront Payments |            | Deferred Payments            |                                    |                               |
|------------------|------------|------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Cash             | LSI Shares | Cash<br>(annual instalments) | LSI Shares<br>(annual instalments) | RSU Shares<br>(cliff vesting) |
| 13%              | 13%        | 20%<br>(6 x 3.3%)            | 20%<br>(6 x 3.3%)                  | 33%                           |

Graphic 11: Overview of the payout scheme for new members in the management body of a Company in the second year (rounded figures to enhance readability).

### 3.6. Backtest and repayment of variable remuneration

Prior to the payment, within a comprehensive review, it is decided by considering the requirements of the InstitutsVergV if or to what extent the variable remuneration under review will be paid out or converted into LSI shares respectively RSU shares.

Therefore, the sustainability of the performance contributions of each Risk Taker, of their area of responsibility as well as the Overall Performance of the Company will be considered. Moreover, the financial situation of the Company, in particular significant changes in the capital base, decreases in the financial capacity and the risk-bearing capacity will be taken into account (backtesting).

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In case of a negative backtest, malus can apply to all elements: the cash portion as well as the LSI respectively the RSU portion of deferred remuneration, in particular in case of evidence of misbehaviour or serious error (e.g. breach of code of conduct and other internal rules, especially concerning risks), negative performance contributions, significant failure of risk management respectively significant changes in the capital base, or significant downturn in the financial performance. In case of the circumstances described above have occurred to a significant degree, a reduction or forfeiture of portions of the deferred variable remuneration including LSI respectively the RSU shares applies.

The regulations on adjustment of variable remuneration are complemented through the implementation of repayment obligations for Risk Takers in accordance with regulatory requirements (so-called "Clawback"). Thus, the specific requirements of the InstitutsVergV, the FAQ to the InstitutsVergV<sup>8</sup> and the EBA-Guidelines are taken into consideration. In case of a significant involvement in or the responsibility for a behaviour which led to a significant loss for the Company or to a major regulatory sanction, or a severe breach of relevant external or internal regulations concerning standards of suitability and conduct has been carried out, the respective Risk Taker is obliged to repay any variable remuneration already paid out respectively any claim to payment of variable remuneration shall lapse.

For 2023, a malus and clawback assessment was performed by the respective line managers as well as by the Main Malus/Clawback Meeting which includes representatives of Human Relations, Internal Audit, Compliance, Risk Management and the Compensation Officer. Within this comprehensive review, potential cases which could lead to reduction or forfeiture of bonus payments respectively deferred remuneration tranches (incl. clawback of already paid tranches) are assessed. The assessment results in a recommendation regarding a potential further treatment of critical cases. A final decision upon consequences lies in the responsibility of the respective Executive Board or the respective Supervisory Board. The malus and clawback assessment performed for Executive Board members and Risk Takers of Clearstream Group was reflected in the determination of variable remuneration for 2023 and for deferred tranches from previous financial year(s). The payout of variable remuneration for 2023 and of deferred tranches from previous financial year(s) was assessed as being in line with the regulatory requirements.

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8 "Fragen und Antworten zur Institutsvergütungsverordnung - FAQ zur Verordnung über die aufsichtsrechtlichen Anforderungen an Vergütungssysteme von Instituten vom 16.12.2013 in der am 14.02.2023 in Kraft getretenen Fassung", dating June 2024

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### **3.7. Prohibition of personal hedging strategies**

The effectiveness of risk alignment would be significantly weakened if employees were able to transfer the downside risks to another party through hedging or certain types of insurance. To ensure the effectiveness of risk alignment, the remuneration policy and remuneration principles prohibit employees to undertake any personal hedging strategies or other countermeasures that confine or neutralise the risk alignment effects of their remuneration. Also, appropriate compliance structures and measures in order to prevent any hedging strategies are implemented, including screening of securities accounts by Compliance and reporting in case of violations by the Compensation Officer. Through this, employees subject to the internal rules including Members of the Executive Board agreed to allow inspections of their securities accounts and to declare if and which personal hedging strategies or other countermeasures they utilised.

#### 4. Information on remuneration

The disclosure of remuneration data pursuant to Section 16 InstitutsVergV in conjunction with Article 450 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 is displayed in the following tables according to the relevant templates and regulatory requirements<sup>9</sup>.

##### 4.1. Quantitative information on remuneration for all employees by business area

According to § 16 InstitutsVergV, aggregate quantitative information on remuneration for all employees of Clearstream Group is broken down by business area:

| amounts in Mio. EUR                | MB<br>Supervisory<br>function | MB<br>Management<br>function | Corporate<br>functions | Independent<br>control<br>functions | All other staff | Total  |
|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------|--------|
| Number of members<br>(Headcount)   | 15                            | 17                           |                        |                                     |                 |        |
| Total number of staff<br>(in FTE)  |                               |                              | 499                    | 170                                 | 1,475           | 2,144  |
| Total remuneration                 | -                             | 10.14                        | 63.99                  | 20.45                               | 154.38          | 248.96 |
| Of which:<br>variable remuneration | -                             | 4.47                         | 12.20                  | 3.05                                | 29.80           | 49.52  |
| Of which:<br>fixed remuneration    | -                             | 5.68                         | 51.80                  | 17.40                               | 124.58          | 199.46 |

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<sup>9</sup> Supplementary information to the above table: In order to maintain confidentiality and for data protection reasons, data are shown on an aggregated and rounded basis (deviations may occur due to commercial rounding). Supervisory Board members are stated as Headcount. As of 31 December 2023, for the three Clearstream Supervisory Boards of Clearstream Holding AG, Clearstream Banking AG and Clearstream Banking S.A. there are in total 15 mandates. Members of the Supervisory Board only receive attendance fees in their function on the Supervisory Board. The total amount of attendance fees in 2023 is EUR 0.27 million. The remuneration information for employees and Risk Takers (including Group Risk Takers) which are not being a Supervisory Board member is disclosed in EUR (foreign currencies are converted into EUR) and includes remuneration awarded for the respective service period for the financial year 2023.

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## 4.2. Quantitative information on remuneration of Risk Takers

In addition to the requirements of § 16 InstitutsVergV, Art. 450 CRR II requires detailed information on the remuneration for Risk Takers ("identified staff"). The corresponding templates pursuant to Art. 17 of the Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/637 which defines the regulatory requirements for disclosure in accordance with Annex XXXIII are shown below:<sup>10</sup>

Template EU REM1 - Remuneration awarded for the financial year

| amounts in Mio. EUR |                             |  | MB Supervisory<br>function <sup>11</sup> | MB Management<br>function <sup>12</sup> | Other senior<br>management | Other identified<br>staff |
|---------------------|-----------------------------|--|--|---|----------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1                   | Fixed<br>remuneration       | Number of identified staff<br>(FTE)  | 15                                       | 14                                      | -                          | 60                        |
| 2                   |                             | Total fixed remuneration   | -  | 5.68                                    | -                          | 17.46                     |
| 3                   |                             | Of which: cash-based   | -  | 5.24                                    | -                          | 15.91                     |
| 4                   |                             | (Not applicable in the EU)   |  |   |                            |                           |
| EU-4a               |                             | Of which: shares or equivalent<br>ownership interests                        | -  | -                                       | -                          | -                         |
| 5                   |                             | Of which: share-linked<br>instruments or equivalent non-<br>cash instruments | -  | -                                       | -                          | -                         |
| EU-5x               |                             | Of which: other instruments  | -  | -                                       | -                          | -                         |
| 6                   |                             | (Not applicable in the EU)   |  |   |                            |                           |
| 7                   | Variable<br>remuneration    | Of which: other forms  | -  | 0.43                                    | -                          | 1.55                      |
| 8                   |                             | (Not applicable in the EU)   |  |   |                            |                           |
| 9                   |                             | Number of identified staff<br>(FTE)  | 15                                       | 14                                      | -                          | 60                        |
| 10                  |                             | Total variable remuneration  | -  | 4.47                                    | -                          | 9.61                      |
| 11                  |                             | Of which: cash-based   | -  | 1.54                                    | -                          | 5.60                      |
| 12                  |                             | Of which: deferred   | -  | 0.91                                    | -                          | 1.68                      |
| EU-13a              |                             | Of which: shares or equivalent<br>ownership interests                        | -  | -                                       | -                          | -                         |
| EU-14a              |                             | Of which: deferred   | -  | -                                       | -                          | -                         |
| EU-13b              |                             | Of which: share-linked<br>instruments or equivalent non-<br>cash instruments | -  | 2.93                                    | -                          | 4.00                      |
| EU-14               |                             | Of which: deferred   | -  | 2.33                                    | -                          | 2.47                      |
| EU-14x              |                             | Of which: other instruments  | -  | -                                       | -                          | -                         |
| EU-14y              |                             | Of which: deferred   | -  | -                                       | -                          | -                         |
| 15                  |                             | Of which: other forms  | -  | -                                       | -                          | -                         |
| 16                  |                             | Of which: deferred   | -  | -                                       | -                          | -                         |
| 17                  | Total remuneration (2 + 10) |  | -  | 10.14                                   | -                          | 27.07                     |

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<sup>10</sup> "Senior management" within the meaning of Article 3(1)(9) CRD corresponds here to the MB Management function.

<sup>11</sup> Supervisory Board members are stated as Headcount.

<sup>12</sup> As of 31 December 2023, for the three Clearstream Executive Boards of Clearstream Holding AG, Clearstream Banking AG and Clearstream Banking S.A. there are in total 17 mandates (headcounts).

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Template EU REM2 - Special payments to staff whose professional activities have a material impact on institutions' risk profile (identified staff)

| amounts in Mio. EUR |   | MB<br>Supervisory<br>function | MB<br>Management<br>function | Other senior<br>management | Other<br>identified staff | Total <sup>13</sup> |
|---------------------|---|-------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------|
|                     | Guaranteed variable remuneration awards   |                               |                              |                            |                           |                     |
| 1                   | Guaranteed variable remuneration awards - Number of identified staff  | -                             | -                            | -                          | -                         | -                   |
| 2                   | Guaranteed variable remuneration awards - Total amount  | -                             | -                            | -                          | -                         | -                   |
| 3                   | Of which guaranteed variable remuneration awards paid during the financial year, that are not taken into account in the bonus cap | -                             | -                            | -                          | -                         | -                   |
|                     | Severance payments awarded in previous periods, that have been paid out during the financial year                                 |                               |                              |                            |                           |                     |
| 4                   | Severance payments awarded in previous periods, that have been paid out during the financial year - Number of identified staff    | -                             | -                            | -                          | -                         | -                   |
| 5                   | Severance payments awarded in previous periods, that have been paid out during the financial year - Total amount                  | -                             | -                            | -                          | -                         | -                   |
|                     | Severance payments awarded during the financial year  |                               |                              |                            |                           |                     |
| 6                   | Severance payments awarded during the financial year - Number of identified staff   | n/a                           | n/a                          | n/a                        | n/a                       | 1                   |
| 7                   | Severance payments awarded during the financial year - Total amount   | n/a                           | n/a                          | n/a                        | n/a                       | 0.08                |
| 8                   | Of which paid during the financial year   | n/a                           | n/a                          | n/a                        | n/a                       | -                   |
| 9                   | Of which deferred   | n/a                           | n/a                          | n/a                        | n/a                       | 0.08                |
| 10                  | Of which severance payments paid during the financial year, that are not taken into account in the bonus cap                      | n/a                           | n/a                          | n/a                        | n/a                       | -                   |
| 11                  | Of which highest payment that has been awarded to a single person   | n/a                           | n/a                          | n/a                        | n/a                       | 0.08                |

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<sup>13</sup> In order to maintain confidentiality and for data protection reasons, data are shown on an aggregated basis.

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Template EU REM3 - Deferred remuneration

| amounts in Mio. EUR |   | Total amount of deferred remuneration awarded for previous performance periods | Of which due to vest in the financial year | Of which vesting in subsequent financial years | Amount of performance adjustment made in the financial year to deferred remuneration that was due to vest in the financial year | Amount of performance adjustment made in the financial year to deferred remuneration that was due to vest in future performance years | Total amount of adjustment during the financial year due to ex post implicit adjustments (due to the changes of share prices) | Total amount of deferred remuneration awarded before the financial year actually paid out in the financial year | Total amount of deferred remuneration awarded for previous performance period that has vested but is subject to retention periods |
|---------------------|---|--|--|--|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1                   | MB Supervisory function                                     | -  | -  | -  | -   | -   | -   | -   | -   |
| 2                   | Cash-based  | -  | -  | -  | -   | -   | -   | -   | -   |
| 3                   | Shares or equivalent ownership interests                    | -  | -  | -  | -   | -   | -   | -   | -   |
| 4                   | Share-linked instruments or equivalent non-cash instruments | -  | -  | -  | -   | -   | -   | -   | -   |
| 5                   | Other instruments   | -  | -  | -  | -   | -   | -   | -   | -   |
| 6                   | Other forms   | -  | -  | -  | -   | -   | -   | -   | -   |
| 7                   | MB Management function                                      | 7.81   | 1.46                                       | 6.35   | -   | -   | 0.09  | 1.38  | 0.73  |
| 8                   | Cash-based  | 2.27   | 0.73                                       | 1.54   | -   | -   | -   | 0.73  | -   |
| 9                   | Shares or equivalent ownership interests                    | -  | -  | -  | -   | -   | -   | -   | -   |
| 10                  | Share-linked instruments or equivalent non-cash instruments | 5.54   | 0.73                                       | 4.81   | -   | -   | 0.09  | 0.65  | 0.73  |
| 11                  | Other instruments   | -  | -  | -  | -   | -   | -   | -   | -   |
| 12                  | Other forms   | -  | -  | -  | -   | -   | -   | -   | -   |
| 13                  | Other senior management                                     | -  | -  | -  | -   | -   | -   | -   | -   |
| 14                  | Cash-based  | -  | -  | -  | -   | -   | -   | -   | -   |
| 15                  | Shares or equivalent ownership interests                    | -  | -  | -  | -   | -   | -   | -   | -   |
| 16                  | Share-linked instruments or equivalent non-cash instruments | -  | -  | -  | -   | -   | -   | -   | -   |
| 17                  | Other instruments   | -  | -  | -  | -   | -   | -   | -   | -   |
| 18                  | Other forms   | -  | -  | -  | -   | -   | -   | -   | -   |
| 19                  | Other identified staff                                      | 12.99  | 3.61                                       | 9.38   | -   | -   | 0.2   | 3.24  | 1.81  |
| 20                  | Cash-based  | 5.07   | 1.81                                       | 3.26   | -   | -   | -   | 1.81  | -   |
| 21                  | Shares or equivalent ownership interests                    | -  | -  | -  | -   | -   | -   | -   | -   |
| 22                  | Share-linked instruments or equivalent non-cash instruments | 7.92   | 1.81                                       | 6.11   | -   | -   | 0.2   | 1.43  | 1.81  |
| 23                  | Other instruments   | -  | -  | -  | -   | -   | -   | -   | -   |
| 24                  | Other forms   | -  | -  | -  | -   | -   | -   | -   | -   |
| 25                  | Total amount  | 20.8   | 5.07                                       | 15.73  | -   | -   | 0.28  | 4.62  | 2.54  |

**Template EU REM4 - Remuneration of 1 million EUR or more per year**

|    | EUR                          | Identified staff that are high earners as set out in Article 450(i) CRR <sup>14</sup> |
|----|------------------------------|---|
| 1  | 1 000 000 to below 1 500 000 | 2   |
| 2  | 1 500 000 to below 2 000 000 | -   |
| 3  | 2 000 000 to below 2 500 000 | -   |
| 4  | 2 500 000 to below 3 000 000 | -   |
| 5  | 3 000 000 to below 3 500 000 | -   |
| 6  | 3 500 000 to below 4 000 000 | -   |
| 7  | 4 000 000 to below 4 500 000 | -   |
| 8  | 4 500 000 to below 5 000 000 | -   |
| 9  | 5 000 000 to below 6 000 000 | -   |
| 10 | 6 000 000 to below 7 000 000 | -   |
| 11 | 7 000 000 to below 8 000 000 | -   |

**Template EU REM5 - Information on remuneration of staff whose professional activities have a material impact on institutions' risk profile (identified staff)**

| amounts in Mio. EUR |  | Management body remuneration |                        |          | Business areas     |                |                  |                     |  |           | -     |
|---------------------|--|------------------------------|------------------------|----------|--------------------|----------------|------------------|---------------------|--|-----------|-------|
|                     |  | MB Supervisory function      | MB Management function | Total MB | Investment banking | Retail banking | Asset management | Corporate functions | Independent internal control functions | All other | Total |
| 1                   | Total number of identified staff (FTE) |                              |                        |          |                    |                |                  |                     |  |           | 90    |
| 2                   | Of which: members of the MB (FTE)      | 15                           | 14                     | 29       |                    |                |                  |                     |  |           |       |
| 3                   | Of which: other senior management      |                              |                        |          | -                  | -              | -                | -                   | -                                      | -         |       |
| 4                   | Of which: other identified staff       |                              |                        |          | -                  | -              | -                | 20                  | 14                                     | 27        |       |
| 5                   | Total remuneration of identified staff | -                            | 10.14                  | 10.14    | -                  | -              | -                | 10.73               | 4.56                                   | 11.78     |       |
| 6                   | Of which: variable remuneration        | -                            | 4.47                   | 4.47     | -                  | -              | -                | 4.20                | 0.82                                   | 4.59      |       |
| 7                   | Of which: fixed remuneration           | -                            | 5.68                   | 5.68     | -                  | -              | -                | 6.53                | 3.73                                   | 7.20      |       |

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<sup>14</sup> In case of split contracts, remuneration data reported in accordance with the legal entity employment contracts.

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