Clearstream Group

Remuneration Report

2014

according to Article 450 of the Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013,

§ 16 of the German Remuneration Ordinance for Institutions (InstitutsVergV) of 16 December 2013


This report discloses information on remuneration for Clearstream Group (including Clearstream Holding AG, Clearstream Banking AG and Clearstream Banking S.A.).
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1. Preamble

Clearstream Holding AG is responsible to fulfil regulatory requirements on a consolidated/group level (“Clearstream Group”) as superordinated company of regulated banking institutions in Germany (Clearstream Banking AG) and Luxembourg (Clearstream Banking S.A.).

The regulations on remuneration are manifested in the Capital Requirements Directive IV (Directive 2013/36/EU, in the following referred to as “CRD IV”) and Capital Requirements Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of 26 June 2013, in the following referred to as “CRR”). According to the legislative processes, the requirements have been implemented at the national levels.

In Germany, the implementation took place mainly through amendments of the German Remuneration Ordinance for Institutions (latest version Institutsvergütungsverordnung of 16 December 2013, in the following referred to as “InstitutsVergV”) and the German Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz, in the following referred to as “KWG”).

In Luxembourg, the CRD IV was not transposed by the legislator at the end of the year 2014. Nevertheless, as a regulation, CRR applied directly and CRD IV remuneration rules were applied in Luxembourg entities of Clearstream Group. In addition, Clearstream Banking S.A. remained subject to the requirements of the Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier (in the following referred to as “CSSF”) Circular 10/496 that refers to the CEBS (Committee of European Banking Supervisors) Guidelines on Remuneration Policies and Practices of 10 December 2010 (including disclosure requirements).

The Remuneration Report for 2014 at hand provides qualitative and quantitative information on remuneration of Clearstream Group for the financial year 2014 pursuant to the requirements that apply to Clearstream Banking AG and Clearstream Banking S.A. on remuneration disclosure according to Article 450 of CRR, § 16 of InstitutsVergV and Article 35 of the CSSF Circular 10/496. Due to the interconnectedness between the different Clearstream companies, the information disclosed in this report covers the remuneration of all Risk Takers identified from Clearstream Banking AG and/or Clearstream Banking S.A. perspectives, regardless the Company Risk Takers are under contract with. Therewith, Clearstream Holding AG discloses information on its remuneration policies and practices for those categories of staff whose professional activities have a material impact on its risk profile (in the following referred to as “Risk Taker(s)”) and more specifically on the risk profile of Clearstream Banking AG and/or Clearstream Banking S.A. The criteria on identification of Risk Takers are set out in the Regulation (EU) No 604/2014 of 4 March 2014 supplementing Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards with respect to qualitative and appropriate quantitative criteria to identify categories of staff whose professional activities have a material impact on an institution’s risk profile of 26 June 2013 (in the following referred to as “EBA-RTS”). Clearstream Banking AG is classified as major institution by the national regulator. In consequence, Clearstream Banking AG must fulfil the general as well as the
special requirements of InstitutsVergV in conjunction with CRD IV and CRR first-time for the financial year 2014. Clearstream Banking S.A. being a significant institution in Luxembourg, it is subject to special requirements set by Circular 10/496 (transposing the Capital Requirements Directive III (Directive 2010/76/EU, in the following referred to as “CRD III” and CRR).

Through implementation of CRD IV and CRR, the Clearstream Group has considerably strengthened its remuneration policy and processes. The implementation of a CRD IV compliant remuneration system was advised by external consultants of Hostettler, Kramarsch & Partner (hkpgroup), Germany, and audited by KPMG Germany.

References made to persons in the masculine for reasons of readability apply equally in the feminine.

2. **Compensation Governance**

   2.1. **Responsibilities for the Remuneration Systems**

   For Clearstream legal entities, the respective Supervisory Board acts as responsible body to implement a remuneration policy for the respective Executive Board.

   The implementation within the different Clearstream entities is performed by the respective responsible bodies:

   - in the two-tier systems the Supervisory Boards decide on the system for the members of the Executive Boards,
   - in the one-tier systems the Boards of Directors decide on the system for all employee groups,
   - in the two-tier systems the Executive Boards decide for the staff below.

   In 2014, the Supervisory Board Clearstream Banking AG met two times for remuneration related topics and the Supervisory Board Clearstream S.A. met one time therefor. The Executive Board of Clearstream Holding AG as superordinated company according to the German Banking Act (KWG) is responsible for the implementation of a Clearstream Group wide remuneration policy and approved several resolutions on remuneration topics. The Clearstream Group Remuneration system is implemented according to a cascading process from group level down to entity level.
The Compensation Officer supports the Supervisory Board of Clearstream Holding AG and Clearstream Banking AG in assessing the appropriateness of the remuneration systems for Clearstream Group and Clearstream Banking AG. The Remuneration Advisory Board of Clearstream Holding AG ensures an appropriate involvement of the control functions in the design and monitoring of the remuneration systems for Clearstream Group. As external consultants, hkp/// Germany as well as KPMG Germany in an project accompanying audit provided implementation support for CRD IV compliant remuneration systems.

2.2. Compensation Officer and Deputy

Within the new compensation governance under CRD IV, the Compensation Officer and the Deputy Compensation Officer of Clearstream Holding AG and Clearstream Banking AG ensure appropriate, long-term and effective control of the company’s remuneration systems according to §§ 23 – 26 InstitutsVergV. The Compensation Officer and the Deputy Compensation Officer have a direct functional and disciplinary reporting line to the Executive Board of Clearstream Banking AG and have a direct functional reporting line to the Supervisory Board.

Main activities performed in 2014:

- involvement in the conceptual development of the design of the remuneration systems for Risk Takers within Clearstream Group,

- involvement in the process to identify Risk Takers Clearstream group wide,

- involvement in the preparation of the merit process,

- ongoing monitoring of the employees’ remuneration systems within Clearstream Group,

- supporting the Supervisory Boards in fulfilling its responsibilities in designing and monitoring the Executive Board remuneration (preparation of Supervisory Board meetings).

2.3. Remuneration Advisory Board

The Remuneration Advisory Board (“Remuneration Advisory Board”) is set up for Clearstream Holding AG by the Executive Board and, in order to involve the control units in the design and monitoring of compensation systems as per the requirements of § 3 of the InstitutsVergV, it includes at least one member from each of Human Resources, Compliance, Risk Management, Legal, Finance and the Compensation Officer. The Audit function is included within the framework of its duties.

The Remuneration Advisory Board is involved in the design and development of Clearstream Group compensation systems covering the remuneration of the employees, the executive employees and the Executive Boards of the Clearstream regulated companies,
before the systems are cascaded through the Group and in particular in Clearstream Banking AG and Clearstream Banking S.A.. The Remuneration Advisory Board supports the Company’s efforts to ensure compliance of its compensation system with regulatory requirements and applicable law.

2.4. Remuneration Committees

In Germany, the Supervisory Board of Clearstream Banking AG acts as Remuneration Committee for Clearstream Banking AG’s remuneration related matters. In Luxembourg, a Clearstream Remuneration Committee is set in 2014 for Clearstream International for those Executive Board members of Clearstream Banking S.A. having a luxembourgish employment contract.

3. Remuneration System

3.1. Remuneration Principles

The strategic goals of Clearstream Group are derived from a strategic process and developed and broken down in a cascade to the single special divisions on the next level and the individuals target agreements.

Remuneration principles are set out in the Clearstream Group remuneration policy, which is reviewed in a regular process and implemented by the respective Boards. Further remuneration principles are included in the individuals’ contracts, the remuneration schemes for Risk Takers and the applicable terms and conditions for the long-term sustainable instrument (in the following referred to as the “LSI”).

The remuneration policy is an important framework to ensure the implementation of the business and risk strategy and is a central element for the implementation of the remuneration systems within the organization. It aims at:

- setting out the principles governing the company’s remuneration systems of Clearstream Group, including Clearstream Holding AG, Clearstream Banking AG and Clearstream Banking S.A., in the organisational guidelines,

- ensuring that the remuneration in the Clearstream companies is in line with the applicable regulations on remuneration,

- informing staff on the applicable rules as well as on their remuneration system,

- describing the determination of variable remuneration pools

- aligning the interests of the owners and staff by using long-term sustainable instruments.
Clearstream Group and more specifically Clearstream Holding AG, Clearstream Banking AG and Clearstream Banking S.A. performed several activities to ensure that the remuneration policy and the remuneration principles are in line with the regulatory requirements and to ensure that the remuneration policy and the remuneration principles are in line with the applicable regulations on remuneration. Further, the remuneration policy has been elaborated through the Remuneration Advisory Board during 2014.

### 3.2. Remuneration Systems for Executive Board and Staff

The remuneration systems for the Executive Board members of Clearstream Holding AG, Clearstream Banking AG, Clearstream Banking S.A. and Risk Taker, executives and non-executive employees consist of a fixed salary and variable remuneration.

In Germany, the fixed remuneration for tariff employees is set out in a company-based tariff agreement between Clearstream Banking AG and ver.di and is utilized for 2014. In Luxembourg, the fixed remuneration of staff takes into consideration the Collective Bargaining Agreement for the Banking Sector in which Clearstream Banking S.A. takes part. Staff employees are granted their variable remuneration in the form of a cash bonus. Staff employees are evaluated through the staff appraisal system.

Regarding the variable remuneration, executive employees who are not identified as Risk Takers receive a cash and a shared-based variable remuneration (according to the conditions of the Stock Bonus Plan). The individual variable remuneration took into consideration the individual bonus range, the company performance as well as the performance achievement scores assessed through the executive appraisal system.

Risk Taker including members of the Executive Board of Clearstream Holding AG, Clearstream Banking AG and Clearstream Banking S.A. receive a variable remuneration according to the conditions of the respective Remuneration Scheme for Risk Taker and the terms and conditions of the long-term sustainable instrument. The individual variable remuneration takes into consideration the individual bonus range, the company performance as well as the target achievements on individual, area of responsibility and institutional level.

The regulatory requirements, set out in the respective remuneration schemes for Risk Taker, are implemented in the appraisal system and are used in the target setting process and the determination of the individual target achievement. Targets are primarily based on a multi-year performance assessment and are defined on the principle that these shall cover the level of the company, the level of the area of responsibility as well as the individual level, and include qualitative and quantitative targets. The individual target achievement is based on the weighted arithmetic mean of each of the targets and is confined.

Depending on the category of Risk Taker, 40-60% of the variable remuneration are deferred over a period of three to four years and paid out after an additional retention period of one year. The LSI links a part of the variable remuneration with a sustainable development. The deferral period is in accordance to Clearstream Group’s business cycle as well as the nature and risk content of Clearstream’s business activities.
For members of the Executive Board as well as employees of Clearstream Group, the relevant shareholders passed resolution on the maximum variable remuneration of 200 per cent of the annual fixed remuneration according to regulatory requirements ("Bonus Cap") with regard to the provisions of § 25 a KWG.

To account for extraordinary developments (i.e. sale or takeover of a business, realisation of hidden reserves, external influences), the Supervisory Board may adjust variable remuneration of the Executive Board members according to § 10 InstitutsVergV.

Further, Clearstream Group does not guarantee variable remuneration in general and only applies the exemption in case of an entry within the first twelve months after entry taking into account appropriate equity and liquidity resources as well as sufficient capital in order to ensure its risk-bearing capacity.

Overall, the variable remuneration system does not incentivize to take disproportional high risks and is designed in a way that bonus can be reduced to zero in order to apply with the regulatory requirements of § 45 KWG.

3.3. Total Amount and Allocation of Variable Remuneration

For the financial year 2014, the total amount of variable remuneration (the pool) was defined in a formalised and transparent process based upon the performance metric of Clearstream Group with the consolidated business performance also of the respective entities, including Clearstream Banking AG and Clearstream Banking S.A. The performance criteria were derived from the Clearstream’s business and risk strategy in order to promote long-term sustainable success of the company and to adequately reflect costs of capital and liquidity as well as risks incurred. The performance metric includes quantitative performance criteria such as Net Income and Value at Risk (VaR) and qualitative performance criteria such as the strategic value contribution which were taken into account. Afterwards, the target achievement of the performance metric was transformed into a Payout Ratio ranging between 0 and 100%.

Clearstream Holding AG’s Supervisory Board resolved jointly with the Executive Board a sufficient total amount of variable remuneration for 2014 taking into account and proving the requirements of § 45 KWG and § 7 InstitutsVergV. Payments will only be made in case the regulatory requirements are fulfilled.

The individual variable remuneration to be awarded is derived from the total amount for variable remuneration of the respective company and the respective Payout Ratio, the level of target achievement and the individual bonus budget (for staff) respectively the individual upper bonus range as set out in the service agreement (for executive employees and Executive Board members). This may not, however, exceed the individual upper bonus range.
Graphic 1: Overview of the requirements to determine the total amount.

The sum of the individual variable remuneration awarded to the members of the Executive Board or the Risk Takers respectively cannot exceed the part of the total amount resolved. Individual levels of target achievement can be adjusted accordingly.

If the Supervisory Board or respectively the line manager for Risk Takers decide in their overall assessment that the awarding of variable remuneration is not appropriate, there is no right to the award. Thereby, the Supervisory Board or respectively the line manager consider all circumstances leading to significant underperformance or negative performance contributions causing significant financial losses or damage to the reputation for the company. This shall also apply in the event of individual unconscionable conduct or conduct in breach of duty as defined in the remuneration policy.

3.4. Risk Taker Identification

According to § 18 InstitutsVergV and EBA-RTS, staff whose professional activities have a material impact on the institution's risk profile, must be identified. In 2014, Clearstream Group performed a risk analysis and identified 52.7 Risk Takers based on these qualitative and quantitative criteria set out in the regulatory requirements.

The Risk Takers of Clearstream Holding AG, Clearstream Banking AG and Clearstream Banking S.A. can be differentiated by Risk Takers as members of the respective Executive Boards, as Risk Takers below the Executive Boards (n-1 Risk Takers) and other Risk Takers. Employees of other Clearstream companies directly involved in providing services to Clearstream Banking AG and Clearstream Banking S.A. within the framework of an outsourcing agreement and having an impact on the risk profile of at least one of the companies were also considered as Risk Takers and were applied the same rules. Deutsche Börse AG’s employees directly involved in providing services to Clearstream Banking AG and Clearstream Banking S.A. for the purpose of conducting banking business or supplying financial services within the framework of an outsourcing agreement were identified as so-called Group Risk Takers.
3.5. Variable Remuneration Scheme

Depending upon the classification of the different Risk Taker groups (Executive Board members, n-1 Risk Takers and other Risk Takers), the payout schemes vary. In general, the variable remuneration consists of an upfront part and a deferral part (either 40/60 or 60/40). Of each part, 50% contain of the long-term sustainable component (LSI). Further, the non-upfront part of variable remuneration will be deferred for a period of three or four years, also depending upon the Risk Taker classification. An additional holding period of one year applies for the LSI.

Clearstream applied the exemption limit up to which the German supervisory authority currently accepts the payout of the complete variable remuneration to avoid disproportional operating expenses. If a Risk Taker is granted variable remuneration of EUR 50,000 and higher, 50% of the deferred and non-deferred parts of the variable remuneration shall be granted in the long-term sustainable instrument. This exemption limit, which is also applied to Clearstream Banking S.A., fulfils the indicative exemption limit of EUR 100,000 set by the CSSF in its Circular 11/505.

3.5.1. Upfront Part

In accordance with the regulatory requirements, 40% of variable remuneration are rewarded as upfront part for members of the Executive Board and n-1 Risk Takers. For other Risk Taker, the upfront part is 60%. 50% of the upfront part (20% respectively 30% of variable remuneration) will be paid in cash in the year following the respective financial year. The remaining tranche of the upfront part (20% respectively 30%) will be converted into long-term sustainable instruments.

3.5.2. Deferral Part

The deferral part will be paid deferred pro rata over a period of four years for members of the Executive Board (respectively three years for other Risk Takers as well as n-1 Risk Takers) in four (three) instalments. Of each, 50% will be converted into LSI shares in accordance with the respective terms and conditions of the LSI with an additional retention period of one year. The remaining 50% will be paid out in cash.

3.5.3. Long-term Sustainable Instrument

The terms and conditions of the long-term sustainable instrument apply to Executive Board members of the Executive Board of Clearstream Holding AG, Clearstream Banking AG and Clearstream Banking S.A. and to employees who have been identified as Risk Takers.

Each of the LSI parts of upfront and deferral part will be converted into virtual shares of the long-term sustainable instrument in accordance with the respective terms and conditions of the long-term sustainable instrument subject to a retention period of one year (four respectively three years deferral period and an additional holding period of one year).
Until the final decision of the Supervisory Board of the company regarding the payout of the awarded variable remuneration, there is no right to the deferred portion of the variable remuneration awarded, or variable remuneration which has already been converted into long-term sustainable instrument shares. During the deferral period and retention period, there is only a right to an accurate determination of the expectant (unpaid) portion of the variable remuneration. In case the total amount will not be approved, portions of the variable remuneration which are due to be paid out, but are not effectively paid out or are not converted into long-term sustainable instrument shares may forfeit and are not carried forward into future years.

As of the date on which the number of shares of the long-term sustainable instrument resulting from deferred and non-deferred parts of the variable remuneration is fixed, the Risk Taker has neither a claim to payment of the cash value of the LSI shares nor any claim for delivery of the LSI shares.

3.5.4. Payout Schedules for Risk Taker (different categories)

The tables below show the payout schedules for each category of Risk Taker.

Graphic 2: Exemplary payout of the Variable Remuneration for members of the Executive Board.
Graphic 3: Exemplary payout of the Variable Remuneration for n-1 Risk Takers (including Group Risk Taker n-1).

Graphic 4: Exemplary payout of the Variable Remuneration for other Risk Takers (including Group Risk Taker other).
3.6. Variable Remuneration under CRD III requirements

In order to meet remuneration requirements set by CRD III and the related CSSF Circular 10/496, Clearstream set specific rules for its Executive Board members in Luxembourg who were identified as Risk Takers. Due to deferral rules, concerned Executive Boards members are still eligible, under certain conditions as described below, to the payment of deferred tranches of variable remuneration for performance years 2011 to 2013.

Under the CRD III remuneration scheme, the performance variable remuneration varied between 0% and 50% of the total annual remuneration. The scheme was designed to ensure an adequate balance between upfront and deferred variable remuneration as well as an adequate relation between cash and share-based components. The variable remuneration takes into consideration the performance of the company as well as the achievement of individual financial and non-financial objectives of the employee.

Where a variable remuneration was awarded, the granted amount was divided into a maximum of 50% cash and a minimum of 50% share-based bonus.

The cash payment takes place in four instalments as follows:

- The upfront payment, representing 60% of the cash part, takes place during the year following the year of the employee’s performance measurement;

- The deferred payment, representing 40% of the cash part, is deferred in three equal payments over a period of 3 years following the first payment. The vesting process foresees a yearly pro-rata vesting.

The share-based part represents at least 50% of the variable remuneration. The vesting process foresees a yearly pro-rata vesting i.e. the concerned Executive Board members acquire each of the following three years a vested right in relation to a third of the deferred share linked variable remuneration. The payments of vested rights are made in cash (“cash settlement”).

The Board of Directors of Clearstream International S.A. and Clearstream Banking S.A. have the right to execute an annual ex-post risk adjustment on the deferred variable remuneration which may result in the reduction (down to zero) of the value of the deferred variable remuneration components and/or the pay-out of the retained part of the share-based bonus. Such a decision would be particularly made in case of evidence of misbehaviour or serious error, significant downturn in financial parameters of the employee’s company/department works for and on which performance measurement has been based, significant failure of risk management in the employee’s company/department, significant changes in the company’s economic or regulatory capital base and fraud or misleading information regarding the parameters used to measure the employee’s performance.
3.7. Backtests for Variable Remuneration

Prior to each payment, within a comprehensive review, the sustainability of the performance contributions is assessed with regard to the initial performance, which led to the award of the variable remuneration. Indicators therefore are, in particular, significant changes in the capital base, decreases in the financial capacity, the sustainability of his performance contributions, area of responsibility as well as the overall performance of the company (Backtesting).

In case of a negative backtest, malus can apply to both elements, the cash portion and the long-term sustainable instrument portion of deferred remuneration, in particular in case of evidence of misbehavior or serious error (e.g. breach of code of conduct and other internal rules, especially concerning risks), negative performance contributions (e.g. if any material assumptions underlying the calculation of the variable remuneration later prove to not be sustainable or to be incorrect), significant failure of risk management respectively significant changes in the capital base, or significant downturn in the financial performance. In case of the circumstances described above have occurred to a significant degree, a reduction or forfeiture of portions of the deferred variable remuneration including LSI shares applies. For 2014, the backtest for variable remuneration did not lead to any reduction or forfeiture.

3.8. Prohibition of Personal Hedging Strategies

The effectiveness of risk alignment will be significantly weakened if staff members were able to transfer the downside risks to another party through hedging or certain types of insurance. To ensure the effectiveness of risk alignment, the remuneration policy and remuneration principles prohibit to undertake any personal hedging strategies or other countermeasures that confine or neutralize the risk alignment effects of their remuneration.

Also, appropriate compliance structures and measures in order to prevent any hedging strategies are implemented, including random checks of securities accounts and other accounts. Through this, all Risk Takers agreed to allow inspections of their securities accounts and to declare if and which personal hedging strategies or other countermeasures they utilized.
4. Information on Remuneration

4.1. By Business Area

According to Article 450 paragraph 1 g CRR, aggregate quantitative information on remuneration broken down by business area:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Clearstream Holding AG</th>
<th>Clearstream Banking AG</th>
<th>Clearstream Banking S.A.</th>
<th>Other Clearstream Group</th>
<th>∑</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Remuneration 2014 Risk Taker</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>52.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total remuneration</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>8.13</td>
<td>9.24</td>
<td>20.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>thereof fixed remuneration</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>6.62</td>
<td>13.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>thereof variable remuneration</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>7.29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Aggregate quantitative information according to Article 450 paragraph 1 g CRR.

1 The remuneration information is disclosed in EUR (foreign currencies are converted into EUR) and includes remuneration awarded for the respective service period for the financial year 2014. In order to maintain confidentiality and for data protection reasons, data are shown on an aggregated and rounded base. Risk Taker are reported as identified as per 31.12.2014 with full-time equivalent (FTE). Remuneration information is allocated according to contractual situation with the legal entity respectively allocated to the legal entity for which the Risk Taker is identified for or delivers services to (e.g. Executive Board member, Group Risk Taker). For Clearstream Banking AG and Clearstream Banking S.A., business activities can not be considered as business units as they are no separate entities or business lines. Further, business activities in Clearstream Group are highly interconnected, so that Clearstream Banking AG and Clearstream Banking S.A. were considered as material business units according to the Risk Taker identification process and reported as legal entities. Due to data protection reasons, there are no further distinctions within each legal entity. The information reported for Clearstream Banking AG include Risk Taker in control and support functions; for Clearstream Banking S.A. control functions, business management, operations and client relations; for “other” control functions, support, operations and treasury. Non-Executive Directors of Clearstream Banking S.A. Board of Directors (one-tier structure) did not receive variable remuneration for their position and are therefore not taken into consideration within the above table.
4.2. By Senior Management and Risk Takers

According to Article 450 paragraph 1 h CRR, aggregate quantitative information on remuneration 2014 of senior management and Risk Taker:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amounts in Mio. EUR</th>
<th>Members of the Executive Board</th>
<th>Risk Taker (including Group Risk Taker)</th>
<th>( \sum )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Clearstream Holding AG</td>
<td>Clearstream Banking AG</td>
<td>Clearstream Banking S.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remuneration 2014</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk Taker</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total remuneration</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>7.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>thereof total fixed remuneration</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>3.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>thereof total variable remuneration</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>3.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total variable remuneration 2014</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>thereof in cash</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>1.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>thereof in share-linked instruments</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>1.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deferred variable remuneration 2014</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk Taker</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total deferred variable remuneration</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>2.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>thereof in cash</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>1.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>thereof in share-linked instruments</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>1.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>thereof vested</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>thereof unvested</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>2.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amounts of deferred remuneration from previous years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>beneficiaries</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>thereof vested and paid out</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>thereof unvested and deferred</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sign-on / buy-out 2014</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>beneficiaries</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total amount of sign-on / buy-out payments</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severance payments 2014</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>beneficiaries</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total amount of severance payments</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>highest such award to a single person</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Aggregate quantitative information according to Article 450 paragraph 1 g CRR, broken down by members of the Executive Board and Risk Taker.
4.3. Information on High Earners

Pursuant to Article 450 paragraph 1 i CRR, the number of individuals being remunerated EUR 1 million or more (high earners) per financial year must be broken down into pay bands of EUR 0.5 million. Overall for financial year 2014 Clearstream entities in Luxembourg remunerated one employee in the pay bracket between 1.0 – 1.5 Mio. € and one employee in the pay bracket between 2.5 and 3.0 Mio €. Apart from those high earners, no other individual was granted more than EUR 1 million.